On the core of network synthesis games
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
Fuzzy kernel-stable coalitions between rational agents
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Bayesian Reinforcement Learning for Coalition Formation under Uncertainty
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Agent-based virtual organisations for the Grid
Multiagent and Grid Systems - Smart Grid Technologies & Market Models
Coalition formation under uncertainty: bargaining equilibria and the Bayesian core stability concept
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A bayesian approach to multiagent reinforcement learning and coalition formation under uncertainty
A bayesian approach to multiagent reinforcement learning and coalition formation under uncertainty
Overlapping coalition formation for efficient data fusion in multi-sensor networks
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Arbitrators in overlapping coalition formation games
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Models of coalition formation among cooperative agents: The current state and prospects of research
Scientific and Technical Information Processing
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In multiagent domains, agents form coalitions to perform tasks. The usual models of cooperative game theory assume that the desired outcome is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions (i.e., a partition of the set of agents). However, in practice an agent may be involved in executing more than one task, and distributing his resources between several (not necessarily disjoint) coalitions. To tackle such scenarios, we introduce a model for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions. We then focus on concepts of stability in this setting. In particular, we define and study a notion of the core, which is a generalization of the corresponding notion in the traditional models of cooperative game theory. Under some quite general conditions, we characterize the elements of core. As a corollary, we also show that any element of the core maximizes the social welfare. We then introduce a concept of balancedness for overlapping coalitional games, and use it to characterize coalition structures that can be extended to elements of the core. Furthermore, we generalize the notion of convexity to our setting, and show that under some natural assumptions convex games have a non-empty core. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to provide a generic model for overlapping coalition formation, along with a theoretical treatment of stability in this setting.