Multi-task overlapping coalition parallel formation algorithm
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Overlapping Coalition Formation
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Overlapping coalition formation for efficient data fusion in multi-sensor networks
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
On agent types in coalition formation problems
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
A distributed algorithm for anytime coalition structure generation
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Dynamic pricing coalitional game for cognitive radio networks
IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Networking
Overlapping coalition formation games: charting the tractability frontier
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Tasks for agent-based negotiation teams: Analysis, review, and challenges
Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Arbitration and stability in cooperative games in overlapping coalitions
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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Overlapping Coalition Formation (OCF) games [3, 4] are cooperative games where the players can simultaneously participate in several coalitions. Capturing the notion of stability in OCF games is a difficult task: a player may deviate by abandoning some, but not all of the coalitions he is involved in, and the crucial question is whether he then gets to keep his payoff from the unaffected coalitions. In [4] the authors introduce three stability concepts for OCF games---the conservative, refined, and optimistic core---that are based on different answers to this question. In this paper, we propose a unified framework for the study of stability in the OCF setting, which encompasses the concepts considered in [4] as well as a wide variety of alternative stability concepts. Our approach is based on the notion of an arbitrator, which can be thought of as an external party that determines payoff to deviators. We give a complete characterization of outcomes that are stable under arbitration. In particular, our results provide a criterion for the outcome to be in the refined or optimistic core, thus complementing the results in [4] for the conservative core, and answering questions left open in [4]. We also introduce a notion of the nucleolus for arbitrated OCF games, and argue that it is non--empty. Finally, we extend the definition of the Shapley value [12] to the OCF setting, and provide an axiomatic characterization for it.