Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Artificial Intelligence
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
Fuzzy kernel-stable coalitions between rational agents
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Bayesian Reinforcement Learning for Coalition Formation under Uncertainty
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
Artificial Intelligence
Algorithms in Real Algebraic Geometry (Algorithms and Computation in Mathematics)
Algorithms in Real Algebraic Geometry (Algorithms and Computation in Mathematics)
Coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Coalitional bargaining with agent type uncertainty
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Sequential decision making in repeated coalition formation under uncertainty
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 1
BROA: A Bayesian Robotic Agents Architecture
MICAI '08 Proceedings of the 7th Mexican International Conference on Artificial Intelligence: Advances in Artificial Intelligence
Overlapping Coalition Formation
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Solving coalitional resource games
Artificial Intelligence
Simple coalitional games with beliefs
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
ICLA'11 Proceedings of the 4th Indian conference on Logic and its applications
Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Belief-based stability in non-transferable utility coalition formation with uncertainty
Intelligent Decision Technologies
Sequentially optimal repeated coalition formation under uncertainty
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Models of coalition formation among cooperative agents: The current state and prospects of research
Scientific and Technical Information Processing
Agent failures in totally balanced games and convex games
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Capability-Weighted Group Utility Maximizer for Network Coalitional Games under Uncertainty
ASONAM '12 Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM 2012)
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Coalition formation is a problem of great interest in AI, allowing groups of autonomous, rational agents to form stable teams. Furthermore, the study of coalitional stability concepts and their relation to equilibria that guide the strategic interactions of agents during bargaining has lately attracted much attention. However, research to date in both AI and economics has largely ignored the potential presence of uncertainty when studying either coalitional stability or coalitional bargaining. This paper is the first to relate a (cooperative) stability concept under uncertainty, the Bayesian core (BC), with (non-cooperative) equilibrium concepts of coalitional bargaining games. We prove that if the BC of a coalitional game (and of each subgame) is non-empty, then there exists an equilibrium of the corresponding bargaining game that produces a BC element; and conversely, if there exists a coalitional bargaining equilibrium (with certain properties), then it induces a BC configuration. We thus provide a non-cooperative justification of the BC stability concept. As a corollary, we establish a sufficient condition for the existence of the BC. Finally, for small games, we provide an algorithm to decide whether the BC is non-empty.