An algorithm for finding the nucleolus of assignment games
International Journal of Game Theory
Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Matching games: the least core and the nucleolus
Mathematics of Operations Research
Coalition formation under uncertainty: bargaining equilibria and the Bayesian core stability concept
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
The cost of stability in weighted voting games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
The Cost of Stability in Network Flow Games
MFCS '09 Proceedings of the 34th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2009
Congestion games with failures
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory (Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Inetlligence and Machine Learning)
Proof systems and transformation games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Sharing rewards in cooperative connectivity games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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We examine the impact of independent agents failures on the solutions of cooperative games, focusing on totally balanced games and the more specific subclass of convex games. We follow the reliability extension model, recently proposed in [1] and show that a (approximately) totally balanced (or convex) game remains (approximately) totally balanced (or convex) when independent agent failures are introduced or when the failure probabilities increase. One implication of these results is that any reliability extension of a totally balanced game has a non-empty core. We propose an algorithm to compute such a core imputation with high probability. We conclude by outlining the effect of failures on non-emptiness of the core in cooperative games, especially in totally balanced games and simple games, thereby extending observations in [1].