Forming coalitions in the face of uncertain rewards
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
Distributed rational decision making
Multiagent systems
Bayesian Reinforcement Learning for Coalition Formation under Uncertainty
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Coalition formation under uncertainty: bargaining equilibria and the Bayesian core stability concept
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Coalitional bargaining with agent type uncertainty
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Simple coalitional games with beliefs
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Preference Coalition Formation Scheme for Buyer Coalition Services with Bundles of Items
International Journal of Systems and Service-Oriented Engineering
Preference Coalition Formation Scheme for Buyer Coalition Services with Bundles of Items
International Journal of Systems and Service-Oriented Engineering
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Coalition stability is an important concept in coalition formation. One common assumption in many stability criteria in non-transferable utility games is that the preference of each agent is publicly known so that a coalition is said to be stable if there is no objections by any sub-group of agents according to the publicly known preferences. However, in many software agent applications, this assumption is not true. Instead, agents are modeled as individuals with private belief and decisions are made according to those beliefs instead of common knowledge. There are two types of uncertainty here. First, uncertainty in beliefs regarding the environment means that agents are also uncertain about their preference. Second, an agent's actions can be influenced by his belief regarding other agents' preferences. Such uncertainties have impacts on the coalition's stability which is not reflected in the current stability criteria. In this paper, we extend the classic stability concept of the core by proposing new belief based stability criteria under uncertainty, and illustrate how the new concept can be used to analyze the stability of a new type of belief-based coalition formation game.