Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
Introduction to Multiagent Systems
Introduction to Multiagent Systems
Introduction to Algorithms
On the computational complexity of qualitative coalitional games
Artificial Intelligence
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On fairness in the carpool problem
Journal of Algorithms
Combinatorial Auctions
Temporal qualitative coalitional games
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Coalition formation under uncertainty: bargaining equilibria and the Bayesian core stability concept
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Computing the Banzhaf power index in network flow games
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations
Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations
Computational complexity of weighted threshold games
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Task allocation via coalition formation among autonomous agents
IJCAI'95 Proceedings of the 14th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Artificial Intelligence
The complexity of contract negotiation
Artificial Intelligence
On the computational complexity of coalitional resource games
Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
Artificial Intelligence
On agent types in coalition formation problems
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
On a Logic for Coalitional Games with Priced-Resource Agents
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Multiagent task allocation in social networks
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
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Coalitional Resource Games (crgs) are a form of Non-Transferable Utility (ntu) game, which provide a natural formal framework for modelling scenarios in which agents must pool scarce resources in order to achieve mutually satisfying sets of goals. Although a number of computational questions surrounding crgs have been studied, there has to date been no attempt to develop solution concepts for crgs, or techniques for constructing solutions. In this paper, we rectify this omission. Following a review of the crg framework and a discussion of related work, we formalise notions of coalition structures and the core for crgs, and investigate the complexity of questions such as determining nonemptiness of the core. We show that, while such questions are in general computationally hard, it is possible to check the stability of a coalition structure in time exponential in the number of goals in the system, but polynomial in the number of agents and resources. As a consequence, checking stability is feasible for systems with small or bounded numbers of goals. We then consider constructive approaches to generating coalition structures. We present a negotiation protocol for crgs, give an associated negotiation strategy, and prove that this strategy forms a subgame perfect equilibrium. We then show that coalition structures produced by the protocol satisfy several desirable properties: Pareto optimality, dummy player, and pseudo-symmetry.