Introduction to the Theory of Computation
Introduction to the Theory of Computation
Alternating-time temporal logic
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Coalition games and alternating temporal logics
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
On the logic of coalitional games
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Solving coalitional resource games
Artificial Intelligence
A logic for coalitions with bounded resources
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Resource-bounded alternating-time temporal logic
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
On the (Un-)Decidability of Model Checking Resource-Bounded Agents
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Expressing properties of resource-bounded systems: the logics RTL* and RTL
CLIMA'09 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Computational logic in multi-agent systems
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) and Coalition Logic (CL) are well-established logical formalisms particularly suitable to model games between dynamic coalitions of agents (like e.g. the system and the environment). Recently, the ATL formalism has been extended in order to take into account boundedness of the resources needed for a task to be performed. The resulting logic, called Resource-BoundedATL (RB-ATL), has been presented in quite a variety of scenarios. Even if the model checking problem for extensions of ATL dealing with resource bounds is usually undecidable, a model checking procedure for RB-ATL has been proposed. In this paper, we introduce a new formalism, called PRB-ATL, based on a different notion of resource bounds and we show that its model checking problem remains in EXPTIME and has a PSPACE lower bound. Then, we tackle the problem of coalition formation. How and why agents should aggregate is not a new issue and has been deeply investigated, in past and recent years, in various frameworks, as for example in algorithmic game theory, argumentation settings, and logic-based knowledge representation. We face this problem in the setting of priced resource-bounded agents with the goal specified by an ATL formula. In particular we solve the problem of determining the minimal cost coalitions of agents acting in accordance to rules expressed by a priced game arena and satisfying a given formula. We show that such problem is computationally not harder than verifying the satisfaction of the same formula with fixed coalitions.