Intention is choice with commitment
Artificial Intelligence
All I know: a study in autoepistemic logic
Artificial Intelligence
Modal logic
Alternating-time temporal logic
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Coalition games and alternating temporal logics
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
A logic for strategic reasoning
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
MASL: A Logic for the Specification of Multiagent Real-Time Systems
CEEMAS '07 Proceedings of the 5th international Central and Eastern European conference on Multi-Agent Systems and Applications V
Reasoning about coalitional games
Artificial Intelligence
Logic for automated mechanism design: a progress report
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Expressing properties of coalitional ability under resource bounds
LORI'09 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Logic, rationality and interaction
Alternating-time dynamic logic
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
DEON'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Deontic logic in computer science
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Tractable model checking for fragments of higher-order coalition logic
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
On a Logic for Coalitional Games with Priced-Resource Agents
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Causality in the context of multiple agents
DEON'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science
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We develop a logic for representing and reasoning about coalitional games without transferable payoffs. Although a number of logics of cooperation have been proposed over the past decade (notably Coalition Logic [14] and Alternating-time Temporal Logic [1]), these logics focused primarily on the issue of strategic cooperative ability -- what states a coalition can effectively enforce - and have tended to ignore the essential issue of the preferences that agents have over such states; in addition, the connection between such logics and coalitional games, in the sense of cooperative game theory, is left implicit. The Coalitional Game Logic (CGL) that we develop in this paper differs from such previous logics in two important respects. First, CGL includes operators that make it directly possible to represent an agent's preferences over outcomes. Second, we interpret formulae of CGL directly with respect to coalitional games without transferable payoff, thereby establishing an explicit link between formulae of the logic and properties of coalitional games. We show that these coalitional games cannot be seen directly as models for Coalition Logic. We give a complete axiomatization of CGL, prove that it is expressively complete with respect to coalitional games without transferable payoff, show that the satisfiability problem for the logic is NP-complete, and to illustrate its use, we show how the logic can be used to characterise axiomatically a number of well-known solution concepts for coalitional games, including for example non-emptiness of the core.