Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
The cost of stability in weighted voting games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
On representing coalitional games with externalities
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
An anytime algorithm for optimal coalition structure generation
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Coalition structure generation in multi-agent systems with positive and negative externalities
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
PRIMA'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Agents in Principle, Agents in Practice
Using personality to create alliances in group recommender systems
ICCBR'11 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Case-Based Reasoning Research and Development
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The two main questions in coalition games are 1) what coalitions should form and 2) how to distribute the value of each coalition between its members. When a game is not superadditive, other coalition structures (CSs) may be more attractive than the grand coalition. For example, if the agents care about the total payoff generated by the entire society, CSs that maximize utilitarian social welfare are of interest. The search for such optimal CSs has been a very active area of research. Stability concepts have been defined for games with coalition structure, under the assumption that the agents agree first on a CS, and then the members of each coalition decide on how to share the value of their coalition. An agent can refer to the values of coalitions with agents outside of its current coalition to argue for a larger share of the coalition payoff. To use this approach, one can find the CS s* with optimal value and use one of these stability concepts for the game with s*. However, it may not be fair for some agents to form s*, e.g., for those that form a singleton coalition and cannot benefit from collaboration with other agents. We explore the possibility of allowing side-payments across coalitions to improve the stability of an optimal CS. We adapt existing stability concepts and prove that some of them are non-empty under our proposed scheme.