On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Artificial Intelligence
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
Generating Coalition Structures with Finite Bound from the Optimal Guarantees
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An algorithm for distributing coalitional value calculations among cooperating agents
Artificial Intelligence
An improved dynamic programming algorithm for coalition structure generation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Optimal Coalition Structure Generation In Partition Function Games
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Exogenous coalition formation in the e-marketplace based on geographical proximity
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
A compact representation scheme for coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Coalition structure generation: dynamic programming meets anytime optimization
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
An anytime algorithm for optimal coalition structure generation
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
A logic-based representation for coalitional games with externalities
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Coalition structure generation in multi-agent systems with mixed externalities
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Computational Aspects of Extending the Shapley Value to Coalitional Games with Externalities
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
On the stability of an Optimal Coalition Structure
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
A Network Flow Approach to Coalitional Games
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multi-agent systems with externalities (i.e., in systems where the performance of one coalition may be affected by other co-existing coalitions). In addition to the conventional partition function game representation (PFG), we propose a number of new representations based on a new notion of externalities. In contrast to conventional game theory, our new concept is not related to the process by which the coalitions are formed, but rather to the effect that each coalition may have on the entire system and vice versa. We show that the new representations are fully expressive and, for many classes of games, more concise than the conventional PFG. Building upon these new representations, we propose a number of approaches to solve the coalition structure generation problem in systems with externalities. We show that, if externalities are characterised by various degrees of regularity, the new representations allow us to adapt coalition structure generation algorithms that were originally designed for domains with no externalities, so that they can be used when externalities are present. Finally, building upon Rahwan et al. [16] and Michalak et al. [9], we present a unified method to solve the coalition structure generation problem in any system, with or without externalities, provided sufficient information is available.