On representing coalitional games with externalities
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Thou shalt covet thy neighbor's cake
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning About a Highly Connected World
Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning About a Highly Connected World
Combinatorial auctions with externalities
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Optimal auctions with positive network externalities
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sequential voting with externalities: herding in social networks
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Towards more expressive cake cutting
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Matchings with externalities and attitudes
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Equilibrium analysis in cake cutting
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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The cake cutting problem models the fair division of a heterogeneous good between multiple agents. Previous work assumes that each agent derives value only from its own piece. However, agents may also care about the pieces assigned to other agents; such externalities naturally arise in fair division settings. We extend the classical model to capture externalities, and generalize the classical fairness notions of proportionality and envyfreeness. Our technical results characterize the relationship between these generalized properties, establish the existence or nonexistence of fair allocations, and explore the computational feasibility of fairness in the face of externalities.