Strongly balanced cooperative games
International Journal of Game Theory
On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Correlated equilibria in graphical games
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
On the complexity of compact coalitional games
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Coalition structure generation in multi-agent systems with positive and negative externalities
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
A logic-based representation for coalitional games with externalities
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
On the complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining set
Artificial Intelligence
On the complexity of the core over coalition structures
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Subsidies, stability, and restricted cooperation in coalitional games
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
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In many real-world settings, the structure of the environment constrains the formation of coalitions among agents. Therefore, examining the stability of formed coalition structures in such settings is of natural interest. We address this by considering core-stability within various models of cooperative games with structure. First, we focus on characteristic function games defined on graphs that determine feasible coalitions. In particular, a coalition S can emerge only if S is a connected set in the graph. We study the (now modified) core, in which it suffices to check only feasible deviations. Specifically, we investigate core non-emptiness as well as the complexity of computing stable configurations. We then move on to the more general class of (graph-restricted) partition function games, where the value of a coalition depends on which other coalitions are present, and provide the first stability results in this domain. Finally, we propose a "Bayesian" extension of partition function games, in which information regarding the success of a deviation is provided in the form of a probability distribution describing the possible reactions of non-deviating agents, and provide the first core-stability results in this model also.