Knapsack problems: algorithms and computer implementations
Knapsack problems: algorithms and computer implementations
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Power and stability in connectivity games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Non-cooperative Cost Sharing Games Via Subsidies
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Power in threshold network flow games
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
The cost of stability in weighted voting games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
The Cost of Stability in Network Flow Games
MFCS '09 Proceedings of the 34th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2009
Coalitional affinity games and the stability gap
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Monotone cooperative games and their threshold versions
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
On the complexity of the core over coalition structures
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Subsidies, stability, and restricted cooperation in coalitional games
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Research proposal: cooperation among self interested agents
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
Proof systems and transformation games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Sharing rewards in cooperative connectivity games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Hi-index | 0.00 |
A key solution concept in cooperative game theory is the core. The core of an expense sharing game contains stable allocations of the total cost to the participating players, such that each subset of players pays at most what it would pay if acting on its own. Unfortunately, some expense sharing games have an empty core, meaning that the total cost is too high to be divided in a stable manner. In such cases, an external entity could choose to induce stability using an external subsidy. We call the minimal subsidy required to make the core of a game non-empty the Cost of Stability (CoS), adopting a recently coined term for surplus sharing games. We provide bounds on the CoS for general, subadditive and anonymous games, discuss the special case of Facility Games, as well as consider the complexity of computing the CoS of the grand coalition and of coalitional structures.