On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Algorithmic Game Theory
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Near-optimal anytime coalition structure generation
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Minimal subsidies in expense sharing games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Computing stable outcomes in hedonic games with voting-based deviations
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
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We present and analyze coalitional affinity games, a family of hedonic games that explicitly model the value that an agent receives from being associated with other agents. We provide a characterization of the social-welfare maximizing coalition structures, and study the stability properties of affinity games, using the core solution concept. Interestingly, we observe that members of the core do not necessarily maximize social welfare. We introduce a new measure, the stability-gap to capture this difference. Using the stability gap, we show that for an interesting class of coalitional affinity games, the difference between the social welfare of a stable coalition structure and a social welfare maximizing coalition structure is bounded by a factor of two, and that this bound is tight.