Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
Artificial Intelligence
On agent types in coalition formation problems
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
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Forming effective coalitions is a major research challenge in AI and multi-agent systems. Thus, coalitional games, including coalition structure generation, have been attracting considerable attention from the AI research community. Traditionally, the input of a coalitional game is a black-box function called a characteristic function. In this paper, we develop a new concise representation scheme for a characteristic function, which is based on the idea of agent types. This representation can be exponentially more concise than existing concise representation schemes. Furthermore, this idea can be used in conjunction with existing schemes to further reduce the representation size.