Extension of MC-net-based coalition structure generation: handling negative rules and externalities

Authors:
Ryo Ichimura;Takato Hasegawa;Suguru Ueda;Atsushi Iwasaki;Makoto Yokoo
Affiliations:
Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan;Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan;Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan;Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan;Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
Venue:
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Year:
2011

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Abstract

Forming effective coalitions is a major research challenge in AI and multi-agent systems. A Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) problem involves partitioning a set of agents into coalitions so that the social surplus is maximized. Ohta et al. introduce an innovative direction for solving CSG, i. e., by representing a characteristic function as a set of rules, a CSG problem can be formalized as the problem of finding a subset of rules that maximizes the sum of rule values under certain constraints. This paper considers two significant extensions of the formalization/algorithm of Ohta et al., i. e., (i) handling negative value rules and (ii) handling externalities among coalitions.