Generalized value decomposition and structured multiattribute auctions

Authors:
Yagil Engel;Michael P. Wellman
Affiliations:
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI;University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
Venue:
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Year:
2007

Citing 11
Cited 5

Efficient mechanisms for the supply of services in multi-agent environments

Decision Support Systems - Special issue on information and computational economics
The Future of Emarkets: Multi-Dimensional Market Mechanisms

The Future of Emarkets: Multi-Dimensional Market Mechanisms
An efficient algorithm for finding the M most probable configurationsin probabilistic expert systems

Statistics and Computing
UCP-Networks: A Directed Graphical Representation of Conditional Utilities

UAI '01 Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
An English Auction Protocol for Multi-attribute Items

AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multiattribute RFQ Process

Management Science
Compact value-function representations for qualitative preferences

UAI '04 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Bid expressiveness and clearing algorithms in multiattribute double auctions

EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions

Management Science
Regret-based incremental partial revelation mechanisms

AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Graphical models for preference and utility

UAI'95 Proceedings of the Eleventh conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence

Preference aggregation with graphical utility models

AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Directional Decomposition of Multiattribute Utility Functions

ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
Multiattribute auctions based on generalized additive independence

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Preference-based English reverse auctions

Artificial Intelligence
A compact representation scheme of coalitional games based on multi-terminal zero-suppressed binary decision diagrams

PRIMA'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Agents in Principle, Agents in Practice

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Multiattribute auction mechanisms generally either remain agnostic about traders' preferences, or presume highly restrictive forms, such as full additivity. Real preferences often exhibit dependencies among attributes, yet may possess some structure that can be usefully exploited to streamline communication and simplify operation of a multiattribute auction. We develop such a structure using the theory of measurable value functions, a cardinal utility representation based on an underlying order over preference differences. A set of local conditional independence relations over such differences supports a generalized additive preference representation, which decomposes utility across overlapping clusters of related attributes. We introduce an iterative auction mechanism that maintains prices on local clusters of attributes rather than the full space of joint configurations. When traders' preferencesare consistent with the auction's generalized additive structure, the mechanism produces approximately optimal allocations, atapproximate VCG prices.