SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Computing equilibria for congestion games with (im)perfect information
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Nearly optimal multi attribute auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Computing equilibria for a service provider game with (Im)perfect information
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Designing and learning optimal finite support auctions
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
On optimal single-item auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful auctions with optimal profit
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On the approximation ratio of k-lookahead auction
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We study a fundamental problem in micro economics called optimal auction design: A seller wishes to sell an item to a group of self-interested agents. Each agent i has a privately known valuation vi for the object. Given a distribution on these valuations, the goal is to construct an optimal auction, i.e. a truth revealing protocol that maximizes the seller's expected revenue.We study this problem from a computational perspective and show several lower bounds. In particular we prove that no deterministic polynomial time ascending auction can achieve an approximation ratio better than \frac{3}{4}. The probability distribution constructed in our example has sensitive dependencies among the agents. On the flip side, we show that if the dependency between the agents' valuations is bounded, the problem can be approximated with a factor close to 1.