On approximating optimal auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
On the Hardness of Optimal Auctions
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Virtual path bandwidth allocation in multi-user networks
INFOCOM '95 Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communication Societies (Vol. 1)-Volume - Volume 1
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue maximization with a single sample
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the approximation ratio of k-lookahead auction
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization
FOCS '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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We study optimal and approximately-optimal mechanism design questions in the interdependent values model, which generalizes the standard setting of independent and private values. We focus our attention on ex post incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms, and develop an analog of Myerson's optimal auction theory that applies to many interdependent settings of interest. We demonstrate two applications for specific interdependent settings: First, a parallel result to the well-known optimality of the second-price auction with reserve for i.i.d.~bidders, where the English auction replaces the second-price one. Second, we identify good prior-independent auctions --- auctions with near-optimal expected revenue across a wide range of priors --- for certain interdependent value settings.