Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Online algorithms for market clearing
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On the Hardness of Optimal Auctions
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Issues in computational Vickrey auctions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce - Special issue: Intelligent agents for electronic commerce
Complexity of mechanism design
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
A Study of Limited-Precision, Incremental Elicitation in Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Implementation with a bounded action space
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Finding equilibria in large sequential games of imperfect information
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Realising Common Knowledge Assumptions in Agent Auctions
IAT '06 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM international conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Lossless abstraction of imperfect information games
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Learn while you earn: two approaches to learning auction parameters in take-it-or-leave-it auctions
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Sequential partition mechanism for strongly budget-balanced redistribution
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Automated online mechanism design and prophet inequalities
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Auctions with severely bounded communication
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Automated design of multistage mechanisms
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computing equilibria by incorporating qualitative models?
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
On-Line Auctions with Buy-It-Now Pricing: A Practical Design Model and Experimental Evaluation
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
A stochastic probing problem with applications
IPCO'13 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Optimal internet auctions with costly communication
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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We introduce take-it-or-leave-it auctions (TLAs) as an allocation mechanism that allows buyers to retain much of their private valuation information, yet generates close-to-optimal expected utility for the seller. We show that if each buyer receives at most one offer, each buyer's dominant strategy is to act truthfully. In more general TLAs, the buyers' optimal strategies are more intricate, and we derive the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the game. We develop algorithms for finding the equilibrium and also for optimizing the offers so as to maximize the seller's expected utility. In several example settings we show that the seller's expected utility already is close to optimal for a small number of offers. As the number of buyers increases, the seller's expected utility increases, and becomes increasingly (but not monotonically) more competitive with Myerson's expected utility maximizing auction.