A Study of Limited-Precision, Incremental Elicitation in Auctions

Authors:
Alexander Kress;Craig Boutilier
Affiliations:
University of Toronto;University of Toronto
Venue:
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Year:
2004

Citing 3
Cited 3

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Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation

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EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal design of english auctions with discrete bid levels

ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
Auctions with severely bounded communication

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Abstract