Communication complexity
Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Incentive-compatible online auctions for digital goods
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Improved Algorithms and Analysis for Secretary Problems and Generalizations
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
Theoretical Computer Science
A Study of Limited-Precision, Incremental Elicitation in Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Optimal design of English auctions with discrete bid levels
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combinatorial Auctions
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Implementation with a bounded action space
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Optimal design of english auctions with discrete bid levels
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
Operations Research
Partial revelation automated mechanism design
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
How pervasive is the Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility?
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Computing equilibria by incorporating qualitative models?
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Voting almost maximizes social welfare despite limited communication
Artificial Intelligence
Multi-dimensional mechanism design with limited information
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
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We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g., that in optimal mechanisms bidders simply report the interval in which their valuation lies in, as well as some surprising properties, e.g., that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones and that multi-round auctions reduce the communication complexity only by a linear factor.