Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Study of Limited-Precision, Incremental Elicitation in Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Optimal design of English auctions with discrete bid levels
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Mechanism design for single-value domains
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Informational overhead of incentive compatibility
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Implementing the maximum of monotone algorithms
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
A theory of expressiveness in mechanisms
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Auctions with severely bounded communication
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Mechanism design with partial revelation
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-dimensional mechanism design with limited information
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
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While traditional mechanism design typically assumes isomorphism between the agents' type- and action spaces, in many situations the agents face strict restrictions on their action space due to, e.g., technical, behavioral or regulatory reasons. We devise a general framework for the study of mechanism design in single-parameter environments with restricted action spaces. Our contribution is threefold. First, we characterize sufficient conditions under which the information-theoretically optimal social-choice rule can be implemented in dominant strategies, and prove that any multi-linear social-choice rule is dominant-strategy implementable with no additional cost. Second, we identify necessary conditions for the optimality of action-bounded mechanisms, and fully characterize the optimal mechanisms and strategies in games with two players and two alternatives. Finally, we prove that for any multilinear social-choice rule, the optimal mechanism with k actions incurs an expected loss of O( 1k2 ) compared to the optimal mechanisms with unrestricted action spaces. Our results apply to various economic and computational settings, and we demonstrate their applicability to signaling games, public-good models and routing in networks.