A Study of Limited-Precision, Incremental Elicitation in Auctions
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We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g. thatdiscrete prices are informationally efficient, as well as some surprising properties, e.g. that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones.