The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions

Authors:
Elena Grigorieva;P. Jean-Jacques Herings;Rudolf MüLler;Dries Vermeulen
Affiliations:
Department of Quantitative Economics, Universiteit Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands;Department of Economics, Universiteit Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands;Department of Quantitative Economics, Universiteit Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands;Department of Quantitative Economics, Universiteit Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
Venue:
Operations Research Letters
Year:
2006

Citing 1
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Abstract

This paper is concerned with information revelation in single-item auctions. We compute how much data needs to be transmitted in three strategically equivalent auctions-the Vickrey auction, the English auction and the recently proposed bisection auction-and show that in the truth-telling equilibrium the bisection auction is the best performer.