Speeding Up Ascending-Bid Auctions
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions
Operations Research Letters
Optimal internet auctions with costly communication
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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In this note we give a survey of bisection auctions. Bisection auctions have been introduced in order to reduce the number of rounds and increase privacy of information in iterative implementations of Vickrey auctions. First, we present the case of discrete valuations. we discuss the strategic properties of this auction and recent results which show that--for 2 bidders--the auction dominates in a particular sense any other auction with respect to the number of bits revealed. For the case of continuous valuations we contrast its properties with the result that no practical query auction can achieve full efficiency in ex-post equilibrium.