iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
BOB: improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations
Artificial Intelligence
On Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Negotiation among self-interested computationally limited agents
Negotiation among self-interested computationally limited agents
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Pure Nash equilibria: hard and easy games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Abstractions for model-checking game-theoretic properties of auctions
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Complexity of Verifying Game Equilibria
CEEMAS '07 Proceedings of the 5th international Central and Eastern European conference on Multi-Agent Systems and Applications V
Verifying Dominant Strategy Equilibria in Auctions
CEEMAS '07 Proceedings of the 5th international Central and Eastern European conference on Multi-Agent Systems and Applications V
Abstracting and Verifying Strategy-Proofness for Auction Mechanisms
Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies VI
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Game theory is popular in agent systems for designing auctions with desirable properties. However, many of these properties will only hold if the game and its properties are common knowledge among the agents. For example, in an auction where truthful bidding is an equilibrium strategy, unless this is common knowledge, it may not be rational for an agent to bid truthfully. It is currently not clear how this state of common knowledge can be achieved, especially in open agent societies where agents may encounter previously unseen auction specifications. We need a method for communicating the rules of the game to the agents, and the agents need to be able to determine its properties. We present a machine-readable language in which the rules of the game can be written. We show that it is not feasible for an agent to determine the properties of any arbitrary specification, unless information about the properties is communicated and/or certain restrictions are placed on the specification. We look at two special cases where common knowledge is achievable: auctions with identical players where the two highest bidders determine the price, and Groves mechanisms with a restriction on the pricing rule.