Representations and solutions for game-theoretic problems
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Combinatorial optimization
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Logic in computer science: modelling and reasoning about systems
Logic in computer science: modelling and reasoning about systems
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Automating first-order relational logic
SIGSOFT '00/FSE-8 Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSOFT international symposium on Foundations of software engineering: twenty-first century applications
Alloy: a lightweight object modelling notation
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Some Tractable Combinatorial Auctions
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Realising Common Knowledge Assumptions in Agent Auctions
IAT '06 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM international conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Abstracting and Verifying Strategy-Proofness for Auction Mechanisms
Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies VI
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Future agent mediated eCommerce will involve open systems of agents interoperating between different institutions, where different auction protocols may be in use. We argue that in order to achieve this agents will need a method to automatically verify the properties of a previously unseen auction protocol; for example, they may wish to verify that it is fair and robust to deception. We are therefore interested in the problem of automatically verifying the game-theoretic properties of a given auction mechanism, especially the property of strategyproofness. In this paper we show how the Alloymodel checker can be used to automatically verify such properties. We illustrate the approach via two examples: a simple two player Vickrey auction and a quantity restricted multi-unit auction using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.