Abstractions for model-checking game-theoretic properties of auctions

Authors:
E. M. Tadjouddine;Frank Guerin;Wamberto Vasconcelos
Affiliations:
University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK;University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK;University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK
Venue:
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Year:
2008

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Abstract

We are interested in verifying game-theoretic properties such as strategyproofness for auction protocols in open agent systems. Model checking provides an automatic way of carrying out such proofs. However it may suffer from state space explosion for large models. To improve the performance of model checking, abstractions were used along with the SPIN model checker. We applied the technique to the Vickrey auction. Numerical results showed the limits of relying solely on SPIN. To reduce the state space required by SPIN, two property-preserving abstraction methods were applied: firstly the classical program slicing technique, which removes irrelevant variables with respect to the property; the second replaces large data, possibly infinite values of variables, with smaller abstract values. This enabled us to model check the strategy-proofness property of the Vickrey auction for unbounded bid ranges and for any number of agents.