On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue: 31st IEEE conference on foundations of computer science, Oct. 22–24, 1990
Temporal verification of reactive systems: safety
Temporal verification of reactive systems: safety
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Automating first-order relational logic
SIGSOFT '00/FSE-8 Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSOFT international symposium on Foundations of software engineering: twenty-first century applications
Alloy: a lightweight object modelling notation
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Algorithms, Games, and the Internet
ICALP '01 Proceedings of the 28th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming,
Graphical Models for Game Theory
UAI '01 Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Knowledge, Rationality and Action
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Programming and Verifying Subgame-Perfect Mechanisms
Journal of Logic and Computation
Settling the Complexity of Two-Player Nash Equilibrium
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Realising Common Knowledge Assumptions in Agent Auctions
IAT '06 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM international conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Complexity of pure equilibria in Bayesian games
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
A complexity based feature to support emergence in MAS
CEEMAS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international Central and Eastern European conference on Multi-Agent Systems and Applications
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We consider the problem of verifying game equilibria in multi-agent systems. We first identify a certain class of games where Nash or Bayesian Nash equilibria can be verified in polynomial time. Second, we show that verifying a dominant strategy equilibrium is NP-complete even for normal form games. Eventually, we consider general games and discuss the complexity of equilibrium verification.