On total functions, existence theorems and computational complexity
Theoretical Computer Science
On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue: 31st IEEE conference on foundations of computer science, Oct. 22–24, 1990
Graphical Models for Game Theory
UAI '01 Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Multi-agent algorithms for solving graphical games
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Pure Nash equilibria: hard and easy games
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Computing approximate bayes-nash equilibria in tree-games of incomplete information
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Settling the Complexity of Two-Player Nash Equilibrium
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Complexity results about Nash equilibria
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Complexity of Verifying Game Equilibria
CEEMAS '07 Proceedings of the 5th international Central and Eastern European conference on Multi-Agent Systems and Applications V
Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games
Approximation and Online Algorithms
Equilibria problems on games: Complexity versus succinctness
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In this paper we make a comprehensive study of the complexity of the problem of deciding the existence of equilibria in strategic games with incomplete information, in case of pure strategies. In particular, we show that this is NP-complete in general Bayesian Games in Standard Normal Form, and that it becomes PP-hard (and, in fixed-precision scenarios, PP-complete), when the game is represented succinctly in General Normal Form. Suitable restrictions in case of graphical games that make the problem tractable are also discussed.