When snipers become predators: can mechanism design save online auctions?
Communications of the ACM - Mobile computing opportunities and challenges
The Impact of Information in Electronic Auctions: An Analysis of Buy-It-Now Auctions
HICSS '06 Proceedings of the 39th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - Volume 08
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
The Landscape of Electronic Market Design
Management Science
Consumer Bidding Behavior on Internet Auction Sites
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Should Online Auctions Employ Dynamic Buyout Pricing Models?
HICSS '08 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 41st Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Online auctions efficiency: a survey of ebay auctions
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Bid or Buy? Individual Shopping Traits as Predictors of Strategic Exit in On-Line Auctions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Online Auction and List Price Revenue Management
Management Science
Temporary and Permanent Buyout Prices in Online Auctions
Management Science
Are online auction markets efficient? An empirical study of market liquidity and abnormal returns
Decision Support Systems
Operational efficiency of decentralized Internet auction mechanisms
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Design science in information systems research
MIS Quarterly
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Several studies have shown that on-line consumer-to-consumer (C2C) auctions operate below their revenue and efficiency potential. From a theoretical perspective, dynamic prices should improve auction performance, but it is unclear whether this is so in practice. Experiments with economically motivated human subjects tested the benefits of using dynamic prices in on-line auctions. The subjects, as buyers or sellers in a simulated auction environment, electronically traded five virtual products and at the end of each session received cash payments based on the experimental profits they generated. The results demonstrate that a dynamic auction design using a dynamic buy-it-now pricing option increases seller surplus as well as overall operational efficiency. Contrary to previous literature, the study shows that some dynamic pricing mechanisms are relatively easy to implement and have the potential to improve current static pricing auctions. Future theoretical models of dynamic auctions should abandon assumptions that unnecessarily restrict the ways dynamic pricing can be implemented.