Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On approximating optimal auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Competitive generalized auctions
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Incentive-compatible online auctions for digital goods
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On decentralized incentive compatible mechanisms
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On correctness and privacy in distributed mechanisms
AMEC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms
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In the digital goods setting we prove that for any randomized auction which is truthful in expectation, there exists an equivalent randomized auction which randomizes over truthful deterministic auctions. By equivalent auctions we mean auctions in which the probability of winning and the expected price offered are the same for all bidders for all bid values. We also prove an approximate equivalence proof in the case where the bids come from a discrete space. Finally, we consider the computational issue of finding an efficient equivalent auction.