Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems
P2P '03 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Randomized truthful auctions of digital goods are randomizations over truthful auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
M-DPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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Algorithmic Mechanism Design focuses on Dominant Strategy Implementations. The main positive results are the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms and computationally efficient mechanisms for severely restricted players ("single-parameter domains"). As it turns out, many natural social goals cannot be implemented using the dominant strategy concept [35, 32, 22, 20]. This suggests that the standard requirements must be relaxed in order to construct general-purpose mechanisms.We observe that in many common distributed environments computational entities can take advantage of the network structure to collect and distribute information. We thus suggest a notion of partially informed environments. Even if the information is recorded with some probability, this enables us to implement a wider range of social goals, using the concept of iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. As a result, cooperation is achieved independent of agents' belief. As a case study, we apply our methods to derive Peer-to-Peer network mechanism for file sharing.