Probabilistic construction of deterministic algorithms: approximating packing integer programs
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - 27th IEEE Conference on Foundations of Computer Science October 27-29, 1986
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Competitive generalized auctions
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Incentive-compatible online auctions for digital goods
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Randomized truthful auctions of digital goods are randomizations over truthful auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On complexity of single-minded auction
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Balanced matching of buyers and sellers in e-marketplaces: the barter trade exchange model
ICEC '04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Electronic commerce
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On decentralized incentive compatible mechanisms
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Marriage, honesty, and stability
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Combination can be hard: approximability of the unique coverage problem
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Single-minded unlimited supply pricing on sparse instances
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful unsplittable flow for large capacity networks
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallel algorithms and architectures
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An incentive-compatible multi-armed bandit mechanism
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Buying cheap is expensive: hardness of non-parametric multi-product pricing
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Optimal mechanism design and money burning
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Deterministic monotone algorithms for scheduling on related machines
Theoretical Computer Science
Spectrum Bidding in Wireless Networks and Related
COCOON '08 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Adaptive Incentive-Compatible Sponsored Search Auction
SOFSEM '09 Proceedings of the 35th Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
A q-learning based adaptive bidding strategy in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Electronic Commerce
GROWRANGE: anytime VCG-based mechanisms
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Impersonation-based mechanisms
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing
APPROX '09 / RANDOM '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Workshop and 13th International Workshop on Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Expressive negotiation in settings with externalities
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Mechanism design with partial revelation
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents
Theoretical Computer Science
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Optimizing ad hoc trade in a commercial barter trade exchange
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Truthful unsplittable flow for large capacity networks
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Preemptive scheduling on selfish machines
CAAN'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Combinatorial and algorithmic aspects of networking
An adaptive sponsored search mechanism δ-gain truthful in valuation, time, and budget
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Maximizing the minimum load for selfish agents
LATIN'08 Proceedings of the 8th Latin American conference on Theoretical informatics
Quantifying the strategyproofness of mechanisms via metrics on payoff distributions
UAI '09 Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pricing randomized allocations
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
Algorithms and theory of computation handbook
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Single-parameter combinatorial auctions with partially public valuations
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
How profitable are strategic behaviors in a market?
ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Bayesian optimal no-deficit mechanism design
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Mechanism design via consensus estimates, cross checking, and profit extraction
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Walrasian equilibrium: hardness, approximations and tractable instances
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Greedy approximation via duality for packing, combinatorial auctions and routing
MFCS'05 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms
ISAAC'04 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
An experimental study of the misdirection algorithm for combinatorial auctions
WAOA'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
On behalf of the seller and society: bicriteria mechanisms for unit-demand auctions
LATIN'06 Proceedings of the 7th Latin American conference on Theoretical Informatics
A monotone approximation algorithm for scheduling with precedence constraints
Operations Research Letters
Approximations and auctions for scheduling batches on related machines
Operations Research Letters
Approximation Techniques for Utilitarian Mechanism Design
SIAM Journal on Computing
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Mechanism Design via Consensus Estimates, Cross Checking, and Profit Extraction
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory
Cost-recovering bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Which mechanism for sponsored search auctions with externalities?
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Computationally efficient techniques for economic mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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Mechanism design seeks algorithms whose inputs are provided by selfish agents who would lie if advantageous. Incentive compatible mechanisms compel the agents to tell the truth by making it in their self-interest to do so. Often, as in combinatorial auctions, such mechanisms involve the solution of NP-hard problems. Unfortunately, approximation algorithms typically destroy incentive compatibility. Randomized rounding is a commonly used technique for designing approximation algorithms. We devise a version of randomized rounding that is incentive compatible, giving a truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents (e.g., "single minded bidders") that approximately maximizes the social value of the auction. We discuss two orthogonal notions of truthfulness for a randomized mechanism, truthfulness with high probability and in expectation, and give a mechanism that achieves both simultaneously.We consider combinatorial auctions where multiple copies of many different items are on sale, and each bidder i desires a subset Si. Given a set of bids, the problem of finding the allocation of items that maximizes total valuation is the well-known SETPACKING problem. This problem is NP-hard, but for the case of items with many identical copies the optimum can be approximated very well. To turn this approximation algorithm into a truthful auction mechanism we overcome two problems: we show how to make the allocation algorithm monotone, and give a method to compute the appropriate payments efficiently.