SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents
Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Monotonicity and implementability: extended abstract
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanism design for single-value domains
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
On 2-Player Randomized Mechanisms for Scheduling
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part I
A global characterization of envy-free truthful scheduling of two tasks
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Extending characterizations of truthful mechanisms from subdomains to domains
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms
Mathematics of Operations Research
Envy-Free Makespan Approximation
SIAM Journal on Computing
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We study the mechanism design problem for scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains both positive and negative values. We show that the class of truthful mechanisms is very limited: A decisive truthful mechanism partitions the tasks into groups so that tasks in each group are allocated independently of the other groups. Tasks in a group of size at least two are allocated by an affine minimizer and tasks in singleton groups by a task-independent mechanism. This characterization is about all truthful mechanisms, including those with unbounded approximation ratio.A direct consequence of this approach is that the approximation ratio of mechanisms for two players is 2, even for two tasks. In fact, it follows that for two players, VCG is the unique algorithm with optimal approximation 2.