An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Searching for the possibility: impossibility border of truthful mechanism design
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Mechanism design over discrete domains
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the importance of migration for fairness in online grid markets
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
The Power of Preemption in Economic Online Markets
GECON '08 Proceedings of the 5th international workshop on Grid Economics and Business Models
The power of verification for one-parameter agents
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Randomized Truthful Mechanisms for Scheduling Unrelated Machines
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the importance of migration for fairness in online grid markets
GRID '08 Proceedings of the 2008 9th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Grid Computing
On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
Journal of Scheduling
On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
On 2-Player Randomized Mechanisms for Scheduling
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
WAOA'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstract
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A game-theoretic method of fair resource allocation for cloud computing services
The Journal of Supercomputing
Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
Theoretical Computer Science
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
A truthful constant approximation for maximizing the minimum load on related machines
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
ACM Transactions on Computation Theory (TOCT)
Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms
Mathematics of Operations Research
Envy-Free Makespan Approximation
SIAM Journal on Computing
SIAM Journal on Computing
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Scheduling selfish tasks: about the performance of truthful algorithms
COCOON'07 Proceedings of the 13th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
Theoretical Computer Science
Theory of Computing Systems
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We present and discuss general techniques for proving inapproximability results for truthful mechanisms. We make use of these techniques to prove lower bounds on the approximability of several non-utilitarian multi-parameter problems. In particular, we demonstrate the strength of our techniques by exhibiting a lower bound of 2 - 1/m for the scheduling problem with unrelated machines (formulated as a mechanism design problem in the seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen on Algorithmic Mechanism Design). Our lower bound applies to truthful randomized mechanisms (disregarding any computational assumptions on the running time of these mechanisms). Moreover, it holds even for the weaker notion of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms - i.e., truthfulness in expectation. This lower bound nearly matches the known 7/4 (randomized) truthful upper bound for the case of two machines (a non-truthful FPTAS exists). No lower bound for truthful randomized mechanisms in multi-parameter settings was previously known. We show an application of our techniques to the workload-minimization problem in networks. We prove our lower bounds for this problem in the inter-domain routing setting presented by Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami, and Shenker. Finally, we discuss several notions of non-utilitarian "fairness" (Max-Min fairness, Min-Max fairness, and envy minimization). We show how our techniques can be used to prove lower bounds for these notions.