Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
An approximation algorithm for the generalized assignment problem
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Convex programming for scheduling unrelated parallel machines
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Distributed Computing - Special issue: PODC 02
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Probabilistic computations: Toward a unified measure of complexity
SFCS '77 Proceedings of the 18th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On designing truthful mechanisms for online scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
ACM Transactions on Computation Theory (TOCT)
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
Theoretical Computer Science
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One of the most fundamental results in the field of mechanism design states that every utilitarian social choice function admits a mechanism that truthfully implements it. In stark contrast with this finding, when one considers a non-utilitarian social choice function, it turns out that no guarantees can be made, i.e. there are nonutilitarian functions, which cannot be truthfully implemented. In light of this state of affairs, one of the most natural and intriguing objectives of research is to understand the inherent limitations in the infrastructure of truthful mechanisms for non-utilitarian social choice functions. In this paper, we focus our attention on studying the boundaries imposed by truthfulness for two non-utilitarian multi-parameter optimization problems. The first is the workload minimization in inter-domain routing problem, and the other is the unrelated machines scheduling problem. Our main findings can be briefly summarized as follows: 1. We prove that any truthful deterministic mechanism, and any universal truthful randomized mechanism for the workload minimization in inter-domain routing problem cannot achieve an approximation guarantee that is better than 2. These results improve the current lower bounds of (1+√5)/2 ≅ 1.618 and (3+√5)/4 ≅ 1.309, which are due to Mu'alem and Schapira [SODA '07]. 2. We establish a lower bound of 1 + √2 ≅ 2.414 on the achievable approximation ratio of any truthful deterministic mechanism for the unrelated machines scheduling problem when the number of machines is at least 3. This lower bound is comparable to a recent result by Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Vidali [SODA '07]. Nevertheless, our approach is considerably simpler, and thus may shed some new light on the core of this problem.