Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Algorithms for selfish agents mechanism design for distributed computation
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
A sufficient condition for truthfulness with single parameter agents
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Searching for the possibility: impossibility border of truthful mechanism design
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Truthful germs are contagious: a local to global characterization of truthfulness
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanism design over discrete domains
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Implementable allocation rules
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Characterizing truthfulness in discrete domains
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Characterizing truthful mechanisms with convex type spaces
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanism design for single-value domains
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and Two-Parameter Agents
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
WAOA'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part I
Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
Theoretical Computer Science
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanisms with verification for any finite domain
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
New constructions of mechanisms with verification
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
A global characterization of envy-free truthful scheduling of two tasks
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Mechanism design: from partial to probabilistic verification
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Near-optimal scheduling mechanisms for deadline-sensitive jobs in large computing clusters
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Multi-parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue monotone mechanisms for online advertising
Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on World wide web
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Weak monotonicity is a simple necessary condition for a social choice function to be implementable by a truthful mechanism. Roberts [10] showed that it is sufficient for all social choice functions whose domain is unrestricted. Lavi, Mu'alem and Nisan [6] proved the sufficiency of weak monotonicity for functions over order-based domains and Gui, Muller and Vohra [5] proved sufficiency for order-based domains with range constraints and for domains defined by other special types of linear inequality constraints. Here we show the more general result, conjectured by Lavi, Mu'alem and Nisan [6], that weak monotonicity is sufficient for functions defined on any convex domain.