Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents
Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Mechanism design for single-value domains
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Fast monotone 3-approximation algorithm for scheduling related machines
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Searching for the possibility: impossibility border of truthful mechanism design
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Mechanism design over discrete domains
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Characterizing truthful mechanisms with convex type spaces
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Randomized Truthful Mechanisms for Scheduling Unrelated Machines
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On designing truthful mechanisms for online scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
Trading in risk: using markets to improve access control
Proceedings of the 2008 workshop on New security paradigms
On 2-Player Randomized Mechanisms for Scheduling
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
WAOA'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstract
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A game-theoretic method of fair resource allocation for cloud computing services
The Journal of Supercomputing
Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
Theoretical Computer Science
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
Theoretical Computer Science
Theory of Computing Systems
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In this paper, we consider the mechanism design version of the fractional variant of the scheduling problem on unrelated machines. We give a lower bound of 2-1/n for any fractional truthful mechanism, while we propose a truthful mechanism that achieves approximation of 1 + (n - 1)/2, for n machines. We also focus on an interesting family of allocation algorithms, the task-independent algorithms. We give a lower bound of 1 + (n - 1)/2, that holds for every (not only monotone) allocation algorithm of this class. Under this consideration, our truthful independent mechanism is the best that we can hope from this family of algorithms.