Trading in risk: using markets to improve access control

  • Authors:
  • Ian Molloy;Pau-Chen Cheng;Pankaj Rohatgi

  • Affiliations:
  • IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Hawthorne, NY and Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN;IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Hawthorne, NY;IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Hawthorne, NY

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2008 workshop on New security paradigms
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

With the increasing need to securely share information, current access control systems are proving too in flexible and difficult to adapt. Recent work on risk-based access control systems has shown promise at resolving the inadequacies of traditional access control systems, and promise to increase information sharing and security. We consider some of the core open problems in risk-based access control systems, namely where and how much risk to take. We propose the use of market mechanisms to determine an organization's risk tolerance and allocation. We show that with the correct incentives, an employee will make optimal choices for the organization. We also comment on how the market can be used to ensure employees behave honestly and detect those who are malicious. Through simulations, we empirically show the advantage of risk-based access control systems and market mechanisms at increasing information sharing and security.