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In this paper, we study randomized truthful mechanisms for scheduling unrelated machines. We focus on the case of scheduling two machines, which is also the focus of many previous works [12,13,6,4]. For this problem, [13] gave the current best mechanism with an approximation ratio of 1.5963 and [14] proved a lower bound of 1.5. In this work, we introduce a natural technical assumption called scale-free, which says that the allocation will not change if the instance is scaled by a global factor. Under this assumption, we prove a better lower bound of $\frac{25}{16}$(= 1.5625). We then study a further special case, namely scheduling two tasks on two machines. For this setting, we provide a correlation mechanism which has an approximation ratio of 1.5089. We also prove a lower bound of 1.506 for all the randomized scale-free truthful mechanisms in this setting.