Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
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Mathematics of Operations Research
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We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders that always allocates all items is an affine maximizer. The second result shows that every truthful machine scheduling mechanism for 2 unrelated machines that yields a finite approximation of the minimum makespan, must be task independent. That is, the mechanism must determine the allocation of each job separately. The characterizations improve our understanding of these multi-parameter settings and have new implications regarding the approximability of central problems in algorithmic mechanism design.