Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Reducing truth-telling online mechanisms to online optimization
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the computational power of iterative auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Combinatorial Auctions
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Linear degree extractors and the inapproximability of max clique and chromatic number
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Impersonation-based mechanisms
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Mechanism design for single-value domains
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Communications of the ACM
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Single-parameter combinatorial auctions with partially public valuations
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Simultaneous single-item auctions
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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In this article, we are interested in general techniques for designing mechanisms that approximate the social welfare in the presence of selfish rational behavior. We demonstrate our results in the setting of Combinatorial Auctions (CA). Our first result is a general deterministic technique to decouple the algorithmic allocation problem from the strategic aspects, by a procedure that converts any algorithm to a dominant-strategy ascending mechanism. This technique works for any single value domain, in which each agent has the same value for each desired outcome, and this value is the only private information. In particular, for “single-value CAs”, where each player desires any one of several different bundles but has the same value for each of them, our technique converts any approximation algorithm to a dominant strategy mechanism that almost preserves the original approximation ratio. Our second result provides the first computationally efficient deterministic mechanism for the case of single-value multi-minded bidders (with private value and private desired bundles). The mechanism achieves an approximation to the social welfare which is close to the best possible in polynomial time (unless P=NP). This mechanism is an algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies, a notion that we define and justify, and is of independent interest.