Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On the Hardness of Being Truthful
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A deterministic truthful PTAS for scheduling related machines
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Black-Box Randomized Reductions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Single-parameter combinatorial auctions with partially public valuations
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms: toward optimal combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Black-box reductions in mechanism design
APPROX'11/RANDOM'11 Proceedings of the 14th international workshop and 15th international conference on Approximation, randomization, and combinatorial optimization: algorithms and techniques
Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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We consider the problem of converting an arbitrary approximation algorithm for a single-parameter optimization problem into a computationally efficient truthful mechanism. We ask for reductions that are black-box, meaning that they require only oracle access to the given algorithm and in particular do not require explicit knowledge of the problem constraints. Such a reduction is known to be possible, for example, for the social welfare objective when the goal is to achieve Bayesian truthfulness and preserve social welfare in expectation. We show that a black-box reduction for the social welfare objective is not possible if the resulting mechanism is required to be truthful in expectation and to preserve the worst-case approximation ratio of the algorithm to within a subpolynomial factor. Further, we prove that for other objectives such as makespan, no black-box reduction is possible even if we only require Bayesian truthfulness and an average-case performance guarantee.