Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Black-Box Randomized Reductions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On optimal multidimensional mechanism design
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Black-box reductions in mechanism design
APPROX'11/RANDOM'11 Proceedings of the 14th international workshop and 15th international conference on Approximation, randomization, and combinatorial optimization: algorithms and techniques
Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Monotone branch-and-bound search for restricted combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Cost-recovering bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A Truthful Mechanism for Value-Based Scheduling in Cloud Computing
Theory of Computing Systems
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We give a simple reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to algorithm design in settings where the agents' private types are multidimensional. The reduction preserves performance up to an additive loss that can be made arbitrarily small in polynomial time in the number of agents and the size of the agents' type spaces.