Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Uniform Budgets and the Envy-Free Pricing Problem
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Pricing randomized allocations
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Multi-parameter mechanism design under budget and matroid constraints
ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
Prior-independent multi-parameter mechanism design
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Near-optimal scheduling mechanisms for deadline-sensitive jobs in large computing clusters
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
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We solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem when either the number of bidders is a constant or the number of items is a constant. In the first setting, we need that the values of each bidder for the items are i.i.d., but allow different distributions for each bidder. In the second setting, we allow the values of each bidder for the items to be arbitrarily correlated, but assume that the bidders are i.i.d. For all ε 0, we obtain an efficient additive ε-approximation, when the value distributions are bounded, or a multiplicative (1--ε)-approximation when the value distributions are unbounded, but satisfy the Monotone Hazard Rate condition. When there is a single bidder, we generalize these results to independent but not necessarily identically distributed value distributions, and to independent regular distributions.