Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish routing with incomplete information
Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On the Hardness of Being Truthful
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Bayesian optimal no-deficit mechanism design
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Single-parameter combinatorial auctions with partially public valuations
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms: toward optimal combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Black-box reductions in mechanism design
APPROX'11/RANDOM'11 Proceedings of the 14th international workshop and 15th international conference on Approximation, randomization, and combinatorial optimization: algorithms and techniques
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
SIAM Journal on Computing
Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Mechanisms and allocations with positive network externalities
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Monotone branch-and-bound search for restricted combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight method
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Cost-recovering bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A Truthful Mechanism for Value-Based Scheduling in Cloud Computing
Theory of Computing Systems
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by the observation that the preeminent approach for designing incentive compatible mechanisms, namely that of Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves; and the central approach for circumventing computational obstacles, that of approximation algorithms, are fundamentally incompatible: natural applications of the VCG approach to an approximation algorithm fails to yield an incentive compatible mechanism. We consider relaxing the desideratum of (ex post) incentive compatibility (IC) to Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC), where truthtelling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (the standard notion of incentive compatibility in economics). For welfare maximization in single-parameter agent settings, we give a general black-box reduction that turns any approximation algorithm into a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism with essentially the same approximation factor.