Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On the limitations of Greedy mechanism design for truthful combinatorial auctions
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
GSP auctions with correlated types
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-keyword sponsored search
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sequential auctions and externalities
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Simultaneous single-item auctions
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Convergence analysis for weighted joint strategy fictitious play in generalized second price auction
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Risk sensitivity of price of anarchy under uncertainty
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Composable and efficient mechanisms
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The dining bidder problem: à la russe et à la française
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Setting equilibrium prices, approximately
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Price competition in online combinatorial markets
Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on World wide web
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We study the following Bayesian setting: m items are sold to n selfish bidders in m independent second-price auctions. Each bidder has a private valuation function that expresses complex preferences over all subsets of items. Bidders only have beliefs about the valuation functions of the other bidders, in the form of probability distributions. The objective is to allocate the items to the bidders in a way that provides a good approximation to the optimal social welfare value. We show that if bidders have submodular valuation functions, then every Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resulting game provides a 2-approximation to the optimal social welfare. Moreover, we show that in the full-information game a pure Nash always exists and can be found in time that is polynomial in both m and n.