Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An adaptive algorithm for selecting profitable keywords for search-based advertising services
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Dynamics of bid optimization in online advertisement auctions
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Online budgeted matching in random input models with applications to Adwords
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
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On the Equilibria and Efficiency of the GSP Mechanism in Keyword Auctions with Externalities
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Bid optimization for broad match ad auctions
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
General auction mechanism for search advertising
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
Toward Expressive and Scalable Sponsored Search Auctions
ICDE '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE 24th International Conference on Data Engineering
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Expressive auctions for externalities in online advertising
Proceedings of the 19th international conference on World wide web
Cost of conciseness in sponsored search auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Computing optimal bundles for sponsored search
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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We investigate search engines' mechanism for allocating impressions generated from different search terms. This mechanism is equivalent to running an independent GSP auction for each search term only when the number of search terms is small. In practice, the number of search terms is so large that an advertiser cannot possibly communicate to the search engine all the GSP auctions that he wishes to participate in. For example, a travel agency is interested in all search terms pertaining to flight, including "flight to boston", "ticket to SFO", "cheap airfare", etc. Therefore, the search engine introduces broad match keywords as a bidding language that allows an advertiser to submit a bid for multiple GSP auctions at once. However, with broad match keywords, the GSP auctions are no longer independent, i.e. an advertiser's bid in one auction may depend on his bid in another auction. We propose the broad match mechanism as a model that captures this aspect of the multi-keyword sponsored search mechanism. We study the performance of this mechanism under the price of anarchy (POA) framework. We identify two properties of broad match keywords, namely expressiveness and homogeneity, that characterize the POA and we prove almost tight bounds on the POA. The bounds allow us to explore trade-offs between the two properties. We introduce the exact-match-only mechanism whose performance, when compared to that of broad match mechanisms, gives us an insight into the net benefit of broad match keywords. The broad match mechanism can also be viewed as a mechanism that copes with severe communication constraint i.e. the valuation of an advertiser is described by many more numbers than the search engine can solicit.